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Abstract. Many mathematical frameworks of evolutionary game dynamics assume that the total popula-
tion size is constant and that selection affects only the relative frequency of strategies. Here, we consider
evolutionary game dynamics in an extended Wright-Fisher process with variable population size. In such a
scenario, it is possible that the entire population becomes extinct. Survival of the population may depend on
which strategy prevails in the game dynamics. Studying cooperative dilemmas, it is a natural feature of such
a model that cooperators enable survival, while defectors drive extinction. Although defectors are favored
for any mixed population, random drift could lead to their elimination and the resulting pure-cooperator
population could survive. On the other hand, if the defectors remain, then the population will quickly
go extinct because the frequency of cooperators steadily declines and defectors alone cannot survive. In a
mutation-selection model, we find that (i) a steady supply of cooperators can enable long-term population
survival, provided selection is sufficiently strong, and (ii) selection can increase the abundance of cooperators
but reduce their relative frequency. Thus, evolutionary game dynamics in populations with variable size
generate a multifaceted notion of what constitutes a trait’s long-term success.
1. Introduction
The emergence of cooperation is a prominent research topic in evolutionary theory. The problem is usually
formulated in such a way that it pays to exploit cooperators, yet the payoff to one cooperator against another
is greater than the payoff to one defector against another [1]. In spite of this conflict of interest, cooperation
is broadly observed in nature, and various mechanisms have been put forth to explain its evolution [2]. In
fact, the question of how cooperators may proliferate in social situations is one of the main concerns of
evolutionary game theory, a framework that models cooperation and defection as strategies of a game.
Evolutionary game-theoretic models typically involve a number of assumptions. In this study, we are
concerned with two potentially restrictive ones: (i) the population size is infinite or (ii) the population size is
finite but fixed and unaffected by evolution. While the classical replicator equation [3–5] can be used to model
large populations that fluctuate in size [6], replicator dynamics capture only the relative frequencies of the
strategies. Even stochastic models that account for populations of any finite size, such as the Moran model
or the Wright-Fisher model and their game-theoretic extensions, usually require the number of players to
remain fixed over time [7–17]. Here, we explore the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in social dilemmas
when the population can fluctuate in size and even go extinct.
Branching processes have a rich history in theoretical biology [see 18] and are a natural way to model
populations that vary in size. A number of recent works have considered non-constant population size
within evolutionary game theory. Hauert et al. [6] treat ecological dynamics in evolutionary games by
modifying the replicator equation to account for population density and show that fluctuating density can
lead to coexistence between cooperators and defectors. Melbinger et al. [19] illustrate how the decoupling
of stochastic birth and death events can lead to transient increases in cooperation. By allowing a game to
influence carrying capacities, Novak et al. [20] demonstrate that variable density regulations can change the
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stability of equilibria relative to the replicator equation. Furthermore, demographic fluctuations can act as
a mechanism to promote cooperation in public goods games [21] and indefinite coexistence (as opposed to
fixation) in coexistence games [22]. Fluctuating size in a Lotka-Volterra model also leads to different growth
rates for isolated populations of cooperators and defectors [23], and even when the two competing types are
neutral at the equilibrium size, fluctuations can still give one type a selective advantage over the other [24].
When traits have the same growth rate, these fluctuations also affect a mutant’s fixation probability [25].
Here, we develop a branching-process model based on the Wright-Fisher model [26, 27] for a population
with non-overlapping generations in which trait values of offspring are sampled from the previous generation
depending on the success of individuals (parents) in a sequence of interactions [28, 29]. Success is quantified
in terms of payoffs, which come from a game and represent competition between the different types, or
strategies. Usually, the Wright-Fisher process is defined such that every subsequent generation has exactly
the same size as the first generation. We consider a variant of this model for populations that fluctuate
in size, in which each individual has a Poisson-distributed number of surviving offspring, with an expected
value determined by payoffs from interactions in a game.
Recently, Houchmandzadeh [30] considered a model similar to the one we study here, but under the
assumption that the population size in the next generation, N pxq, is a deterministic function of the fraction
of cooperators in the present generation, x. The update rule then has essentially two stages: (i) determine the
population size of the next generation, N pxq, and (ii) sample N pxq offspring from the previous generation
using the standard Wright-Fisher rule [30]. In contrast, the model we treat has a stochastic population
size that does not need to be prespecified. Moreover, it depends on the numbers of both cooperators and
defectors in the current generation, not just on the fraction of cooperators. As mentioned above, we also
allow for the possibility that the entire population goes extinct.
We use the public goods game to study the evolution of cooperation in an unstructured population.
Cooperators maintain a shared resource or public good, with a cost, w, to their fecundity. Defectors neither
help maintain the public good nor incur a cost. The resource is distributed evenly among all individuals
in the population, but its per-capita effect on fecundity can be greater than the per-capita cost of its
production [31]. A multiplication factor, R ą 1, quantifies this return on the investment made by cooperators
toward production of the good. In this model, everyone is better off when the whole population consists of
cooperators, but defectors can benefit from cooperation without paying the cost.
We show that when the population size can fluctuate, selection can be essential for the survival of the
population as a whole. In our model, population growth and decline are influenced by the public goods
game but also by a baseline reproductive capacity, fN , which is the same for all individuals and which
primarily acts to constrain runaway growth. Even when cooperators are less frequent than defectors in
the mutation-selection equilibrium, there can be an optimal cost of cooperation, w˚, depending on fN , at
which (i) the population does not immediately go extinct, with the numbers of cooperators and defectors
each fluctuating around equilibrium values, and (ii) the frequency of cooperators is maximized subject to
(i). In other words, cooperation can be favored by selection at a positive cost of cooperation when there is
demographic stochasticity, which marks a departure from the behavior of models with fixed size.
Furthermore, even when the population would survive due to the baseline reproductive capacity alone,
selection can increase the number of cooperators while at the same time decreasing their frequency. In models
where the population size is assumed to be fixed, cooperators are less frequent than defectors if and only if
cooperators are less abundant than defectors. However, this equivalence breaks down when the population
size can fluctuate because the frequency of a strategy is determined by both its abundance and the population
size. Thus, the evolutionary success of a strategic type depends on more than just the strategy.
2. Description of the model
We use the term “reproductive capacity” rather than “fitness” [see 32] to refer to the expected number of
offspring of an individual. In a growing population, the average reproductive capacity is greater than one.
In a shrinking population, it is less than one. In a population of fixed size or a population at its carrying
capacity, the average reproductive capacity is equal to one. If different individuals in the same population
have different reproductive capacities, some individuals have a selective advantage over others.
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2.1. Update rule. We assume that individuals reproduce asexually, so our model corresponds to a model of
haploid genetic transmission. In the standard Wright-Fisher process, the population has fixed size, N . Thus,
in a game with two strategies, C (“cooperate”) and D (“defect”), the state of the population is determined
by number of cooperators, xC , or by their relative frequency, xC{N . If FC “ FC pxCq and FD “ FD pxCq
give the reproductive capacities of cooperators and defectors, respectively, in the state with xC cooperators,
then the probability of transitioning to the state with yC cooperators (provided 0 ď yC ď N) is
P pyC | xCq “
ˆ
N
yC
˙ˆ
xCFC
xCFC ` pN ´ xCqFD
˙yC ˆ pN ´ xCqFD
xCFC ` pN ´ xCqFD
˙N´yC
. (1)
In other words, the cooperators in one generation are sampled from the previous generation according to
a binomial distribution with mean NxCFC{ pxCFC ` pN ´ xCqFDq. One biological interpretation for this
transition rule is the following: Each player in one generation produces a large number of gametes from
which the surviving offspring in the next generation are selected. These offspring are sampled at random,
weighted by the success of the parents in competitive interactions, subject to a constant population size.
In treating populations that fluctuate in size, we drop the assumed dependence that yD “ N ´ yC which
is implied above, but continue to hold that generations are non-overlapping. Let FC “ FC pxC , xDq and
FD “ FD pxC , xDq give the reproductive capacities of cooperators and defectors, respectively, when the
current generation is in state pxC , xDq. We assume that the number of offspring per individual follows
a Poisson distribution, with parameter FC for cooperators and parameter FD for defectors. Then the
probability of transitioning from state pxC , xDq to state pyC , yDq in one generation is
P pyC , yD | xC , xDq “
ˆ pxCFCqyC e´xCFC
yC !
˙ˆ pxDFDqyD e´xDFD
yD!
˙
. (2)
Eq. 2 reduces to Eq. 1 when the population size is fixed and equal to N (see [33] and also Appendix A).
The transition probabilities of Eqs. 1–2 do not take into account errors in strategy transmission, i.e.
mutations. In what follows, we assume that when an individual reproduces, the offspring acquires a random
strategy with probability u ě 0. Thus, with probability 1´u, the offspring acquires the strategy of the parent
and with probability u, becomes either a cooperator or a defector (uniformly at random). For simplicity
(and by convention [e.g. see 34]), we assume symmetric mutation, with C Ñ D as likely as D Ñ C.
Using the binomial distribution with parameter q and density function bq pn, kq :“
`
n
k
˘
qk p1´ qqn´k, the
mutation rate, u, is incorporated into the transition rule defined by Eq. 2 as follows:
Pu pyC , yD | xC , xDq “
yC`yDÿ
zC“0
P pzC , yC ` yD ´ zC | xC , xDq
ˆ
mintzC ,yDuÿ
k“maxt0,zC´yCu
bu{2 pzC , kq bu{2 pyC ` yD ´ zC , k ` yC ´ zCq . (3)
In words, we sum over all transitions defined by Eq. 2 such that, after mutations are accounted for, there
are yC cooperators and yD defectors. Note that mutations themselves do not affect the population size.
We refer to the process with transitions governed by Eqs. 2–3 as a “Wright-Fisher branching process.”
Branching processes of this sort have been treated elsewhere [see 33], notably with Poisson-distributed
offspring counts but frequency-independent reproductive capacities [35]. Branching processes have also
been considered in models with both density-dependent [36] and frequency-dependent [37, 38] reproductive
capacities. We consider a Wright-Fisher branching process in which the reproductive capacities of cooperators
and defectors in Eqs. 2–3 are equal to a baseline reproductive capacity times a factor which depends on
the outcome of a public goods game.
2.2. Baseline reproductive capacity. The standard Wright-Fisher model, and variants like that in [30],
assume that population regulation is very strong or deterministic. This may be a good approximation for
large populations and those close to carrying capacity [but see 24]. However, fully stochastic treatments are
warranted for populations that fluctuate in size and may go extinct. In the Wright-Fisher branching process
we consider, population regulation is achieved through a balance of players’ payoffs in an evolutionary game
and a baseline reproductive capacity which represents all other ecological factors. The dynamics depend on
3
Figure 1. Two examples of baseline reproductive capacities, fN . In (A), fN “
max
 
0, cK ` r
`
1´ NK
˘(
for cK “ 1.1, r “ 0.01, and K “ 100. This function decreases
linearly to 0 and remains at 0 for all sufficiently large N since the reproductive capacity is
(by definition) non-negative. This function is called “rectified” linear because of the con-
straint that fN ě 0. In (B), fN “ p1` rqmin
 
1, KN
(
for r “ ´0.001 and K “ 5000. The
reproductive capacity is held constant and equal to 1 ` r whenever 1 ď N ď K. When
the population size is greater than K, the resources contributing to reproductive capacities
are no longer abundant and must be divided up among the individuals in the population,
which gives the expression fN “ p1` rq KN for N ě K. This function is called “threshold-
constant” because it is constant up to the threshold population size N “ K. Note that in
(A), when the population size is initially small, there is net population growth since f1 ą 1.
In (B), fN ă 1 for every N , so any population evolving according to this function alone
will (on average) shrink in the direction of extinction. This immediate extinction could be
prevented by choosing r ą 0 instead of r ă 0 as in (B).
the numbers of cooperators and defectors, not just on their relative frequencies. The baseline reproductive
capacity is a function of the total population size and is the same for every individual. It captures the
ecological constraints which keep populations from growing without limit.
Let fN be the per-capita reproductive capacity (again, the expected number of offspring) applicable to
all individuals when the population size is N . We assume that fN is a non-increasing function of the
population size, N , so that larger populations lead (in general) to lower per-capita reproductive capacities
due to ecological constraints. This baseline reproductive capacity is the fluctuating-size analogue of the
“background fitness” that is typically used in models with fixed population size [15].
While the baseline reproductive capacity does not vary from player to player, it can depend on the number
of players in the population, N . If there are limited resources and reproduction slows as the population grows,
then fN is a decreasing function of N . An example we consider is fN “ cK ` r
`
1´ NK
˘
for some cK , r,
and K. In this case, r reflects the growth rate when the population is small, and cK gives the reproductive
capacity when the population has size N “ K. To ensure fN is non-negative, we set fN “ 0 whenever
cK ` r
`
1´ NK
˘ ď 0. A second example we consider is one in which the baseline reproductive capacity is
constant up to a threshold value of N and decreasing thereafter, specifically with fN “ 1` r if N ď K and
fN “ p1` rqK{N if N ą K for some r and K. For both of these functions, fN decays to 0 as N Ñ8 (see
Fig. 1).
2.3. Public goods game. Consider a game with two strategies, C (“cooperate”) and D (“defect”), and
suppose that a defector does nothing and a cooperator incurs a cost, w, representing a fraction of his or her
baseline reproductive capacity, fN , in order to contribute to the provision of a public good. The public good
4
is distributed evenly among all N players in the population [31]. Finally, a multiplication factor, R ą 1,
quantifies the return on investment in this shared resource [39].
The reproductive capacities of cooperators and defectors in state pxC , xDq are given by
FC pxC , xDq “
ˆ
1´ w ` wR xC
xC ` xD
˙
fxC`xD ; (4a)
FD pxC , xDq “
ˆ
1` wR xC
xC ` xD
˙
fxC`xD . (4b)
When w ! 1, the contribution of this game to reproductive capacity is small. On the other hand, when
w “ 1, cooperators expend their entire baseline reproductive capacity contributing to the public good. Unlike
in many evolutionary games in populations of fixed size, where w represents selection strength and quantifies
relative differences between traits, here the cost of cooperation admits an intuitive biological interpretation:
cooperators sacrifice a fraction w of their expected number of offspring in hopes of seeing a return.
For a neutral population whose dynamics are governed only by the non-increasing baseline reproductive
capacity, fN , if f1 ă 1 then the time to extinction will be relatively short. In contrast, if f1 ą 1 the
population will have a positive growth rate until N becomes large enough that fN ă 1. Then the population
will grow to a stochastic carrying capacity and fluctuate around this size, possibly for considerable time.
(For the two classes of baseline reproductive capacities we consider here, this carrying capacity need not
be exactly K; see Appendix A). We will refer to situations of this sort as “metastable” because all the
populations we consider would eventually go extinct. According to Eq. 4, payoffs from the public goods
game can increase reproductive capacities, with the possibility of positive population growth rates even if
f1 ă 1. Due to our choice of non-increasing functions for fN (that decay to 0 as N grows), this will lead to
metastable states but never to unbounded growth of the population.
3. Evolutionary dynamics of the Wright-Fisher branching process
Let EpxC ,xDq ryCs and EpxC ,xDq ryDs denote the expected numbers of cooperator and defectors in the next
generation given xC cooperators and xD defectors in the current generation. In this section, we are mainly
interested in the existence of metastable equilibria, which are defined as states, pxC˚ , xD˚q, such that
Epx˚C ,x˚Dq ryCs “ xC˚ ; (5a)
Epx˚C ,x˚Dq ryDs “ xD˚. (5b)
Populations will fluctuate around these states for some time, although extinction is inevitable. The time
to extinction depends on the population’s carrying capacity (see below and Appendix C). Even when the
population eventually goes extinct with probability 1, it can take extremely long to do so.
We are particularly interested in the case when a population of defectors cannot survive for long on
their own but a population of cooperators can. While a population of defectors evolves according to fN , a
population of cooperators evolves according to the reproductive capacity p1` w pR´ 1qq fN , which can be
greater than 1 even when fN ă 1. In polymorphic populations, cooperators and defectors have reproductive
capacities given by FC pxC , xDq and FD pxC , xDq in Eq. 4, which are functions of xC and xD, but also
depend on the baseline reproductive capacity, fN , the cost of cooperation, w, and the multiplication factor
for the public good, R. We also consider situations in which a population of defectors can reach a metastable
carrying capacity, i.e. when f1 ą 1. In this case, we are interested in the effects that w and R can have on
the numbers of cooperators and defectors in polymorphic metastable states.
3.1. Selection dynamics (without mutation). When the initial numbers of cooperators and defectors
are small, stochastic effects have a profound influence over the long-run composition of the population. We
show in Appendix B that any non-zero metastable equilibrium must be monomorphic (all-cooperator or
all-defector) for the update rule defined by Eq. 2. Although defectors generally have larger growth rates
than cooperators in mixed populations, they can go extinct quickly in small populations, which, in turn, can
permit cooperators to prosper. For example, suppose that defectors cannot survive on their own (f1 ă 1),
which means that any population of defectors shrinks, on average, from one generation to the next. If any
population of cooperators grows, due to the multiplication factor R ą 1, then the only populations that
persist beyond a short time horizon are those composed entirely of cooperators. Therefore, cooperators have
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Figure 2. Dynamics of the Wright-Fisher branching process in the absence of muta-
tion. The baseline reproductive capacity is given by fN “ max
 
0, cK ` r
`
1´ NK
˘(
, where
cK “ 0.99, r “ 0.01, and K “ 100. The initial population consists of just 5 cooperators
and 5 defectors. Approximately 15% (rounded to the nearest percentage) of runs result
in the behavior of panel (B), with defectors going extinct and cooperators reaching their
carrying capacity. The remaining runs resemble panel (A), with almost-immediate extinc-
tion of the entire population. Without mutation, any metastable equilibrium is necessarily
monomorphic; since defectors cannot survive on their own (f1 ă 1), it follows that only
all-cooperator states can be observed as the long-run outcome of these initial conditions.
Notably, while defectors go extinct in fewer than 200 generations in (A), in (B) the popula-
tion of cooperators thrives even after 109 generations (although it goes extinct, eventually,
with probability 1). To demonstrate the initial ascent of cooperators, we include here only
the first 500 generations. Parameters: u “ 0, w “ 0.1, and R “ 2.0.
a type of survivorship bias. Fig. 2 illustrates this phenomenon, showing that defectors often outcompete
cooperators (approximately 85% of the time) when both are in the population (A), but once one type goes
extinct, the population must consist of just cooperators in order to survive for any considerable length of time
(B). These simulations are done with the baseline capacity fN “ max
 
0, cK ` r
`
1´ NK
˘(
, where cK “ 0.99,
r “ 0.01, and K “ 100; cost of cooperation w “ 0.1; and multiplication factor R “ 2.0.
3.2. Mutation-selection dynamics. A common way to quantify the evolutionary success of cooperators is
to introduce strategy mutations and study the frequency of cooperators in the mutation-selection equilibrium
[34, 40, 41]. Mutations indicate errors in the transmission (either cultural or genetic) of the two strategies
(cooperation and defection) and can be small [42, 43] or large [44] depending on their interpretation. The
success of cooperation is quantified by its average frequency in the population over many generations. In
a population of cooperators and defectors under neutral drift (i.e. without selective differences between
the two types), cooperators are indistinguishable from defectors and are equally frequent in the mutation-
selection equilibrium. If selection brings the cooperator frequency above 1{2, then selection is said to favor
cooperation. By this metric, selection typically disfavors cooperation in unstructured populations [34].
If the population size is static and the update rule is that of the Wright-Fisher process, Eq. 1, then the
baseline reproductive capacity appearing in Eq. 4, fN , cancels out. Only the relative fitnesses of cooperators
and defectors matters. The dynamics are then captured in the relative frequencies of cooperators and
defectors. Since cooperators are always less frequent than defectors when the intensity of selection, w, is
positive, selection unambiguously disfavors cooperators relative to defectors. This result can be seen in
Fig. 3(D)–(F), in which results are shown for three different values of w. These simulations were generated
using a multiplication factor of R “ 2.0 and a mutation rate of u “ 0.01. That selection favors defectors is
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Figure 3. Mutation-selection dynamics for the Wright-Fisher branching process (panels
(A)–(C)) and the Wright-Fisher process with constant population size (panels (D)–(F)). The
baseline reproductive capacity is fN “ p1` rqmin
 
1, KN
(
, where r “ ´0.001 and K “ 5000,
although this is relevant only for (A)–(C) since the population size is held fixed in (D)–(F).
In all panels, the population initially consists of 2500 cooperators and 2500 defectors, the
strategy mutation rate is u “ 0.01, and the multiplication factor for the public goods game
is R “ 2.0. In the top row, the population size can fluctuate over time; in the bottom row, it
is held constant at 5000 players. In (A) and (D), there are no selective differences between
cooperators and defectors (w “ 0). In (B) and (E), a cooperator sacrifices a small fraction,
w “ 0.002, of his or her baseline reproductive capacity in order to provide the community
with a benefit. In (C) and (F), cooperators sacrifice a larger portion, w “ 0.01, of their
reproductive capacity when provisioning a public good. While the population is artificially
prevented from going extinct in (D)–(F), it can go extinct in (A)–(C) and does so quickly
when the cost of cooperation is too small (panels (A) and (B)) since f1 ă 1. Although
increasing the cost of cooperation tends to decrease the frequency of cooperators relative to
defectors, a sufficient amount of selection is necessary for the survival of the population as
a whole. Therefore, there is an optimal cost of cooperation, w˚, falling between 0.002 and
0.01, that maximizes the frequency of cooperators subject to survival of the population.
a standard property of many social dilemmas in unstructured populations; additional mechanisms (such as
spatial structure) must typically be present in order for cooperators to outperform defectors [15].
When the population size can fluctuate and u is the probability that a mutation occurs, then the dynamics
are governed by Eq. 3. Here, it is still the case that selection decreases the frequency of cooperators relative
to defectors. On the other hand, the population can quickly go extinct if selection is not sufficiently strong,
which we illustrate in Fig. 3(A)–(C) with R “ 2.0, u “ 0.01, and fN “ p1` rqmin
 
1, KN
(
with r “ ´0.001
and K “ 5000. Thus, cooperation can be favored in such situations because it protects against extinction.
One key difference from models with fixed population size is that, in a branching process, the population
either grows unboundedly or eventually goes extinct [45, 46]. That is, if the population remains bounded in
size, then the only true stationary state is extinction. Despite this behavior capturing the long-run dynamics
7
Figure 4. Simulation of the quasi-stationary distribution for several values of K. Here,
K enters in the baseline reproductive capacity, fN “ p1` rqmin
 
1, KN
(
, where r “
´0.001. In each panel, cooperators and defectors are each initialized at an equal abun-
dance of K{2. The plots are histograms for cooperator (blue) and defector (red) abun-
dance over the first 25000 generations. The equilibrium fraction of cooperators, p, de-
pends on only u, w, and R and is the same for all panels. Therefore, the peaks are
centered at xC˚{K “ 0.999x p1` w pR´ 1qxq « 0.2954 for cooperators and xD˚{K “
0.999 p1´ xq p1` w pR´ 1qxq « 0.7066 for defectors (see Appendix B). As K grows, this
quasi-stationary distribution converges to the Dirac measure centered on p0.2954, 0.7066q.
Parameters: u “ w “ 0.01 and R “ 2.0.
of the process, there can also exist metastable equilibria in which the process persists prior to population
extinction. We show in Appendix C that the persistence time in our model grows exponentially in K [see
also 47–49], meaning that if E rτKs is the expected number of generations prior to extinction after starting
in the quasi-stationary distribution, then there exists c ą 0 (independent of K) for which E rτKs ě ecK .
More informally, if pxC˚ , xD˚q is a metastable equilibrium and σ denotes standard deviation, then
σpx˚C ,x˚Dq ryCs {Epx˚C ,x˚Dq ryCs “
1a
xC˚
; (6a)
σpx˚C ,x˚Dq ryDs {Epx˚C ,x˚Dq ryDs “
1a
xD˚
. (6b)
Therefore, the fluctuations around a metastable equilibrium constitute only small fractions of xC˚ and xD˚
when xC˚ and xD˚ are sufficiently large (see Appendix B for further details). Since xC˚ and xD˚ grow with K,
and since the fluctuations in xC˚ and xD˚ are on the order of
a
xC˚ and
a
xD˚, respectively, the expected amount
of time until deviations from the mean destroy the population, i.e. deviates so far as to hit pxC , xDq “ p0, 0q,
grows rapidly inK. Fig. 4 shows the quasi-stationary distributions of xC and xD that result from fluctuations
around metastable equilibria, such as those shown in Fig. 3(C).
The dynamics of this public goods game result from the balance among three factors: mutation, selection,
and population survival. Although long-term population survival can be achieved by increasing the cost of
cooperation, w, it can also be destroyed by decreasing the mutation rate, u. In Appendix B, we show that
for any N ě 1 and any non-zero mutation rate and cost of cooperation, there exists a critical multiplication
factor, RN˚ , such that the population is supported at a metastable equilibrium consisting of at least N players
whenever R ą RN˚ . In general, the harmful effect (population extinction) of either low costs of cooperation
or low mutation rates can be mitigated by increasing the return on investment in the public good.
Selection can also increase cooperator abundance while decreasing their relative frequency (Fig. 5). This
phenomenon is a consequence of the fact that the presence of cooperators can change the carrying capacity
of population. That abundance and frequency can move in opposite directions is unique to models with
variable population size and presents an interesting question about the definition of cooperator success. We
show in Appendix B that the fraction of cooperators present in a metastable equilibrium is independent of
fN and depends on just u, w, and R. Thus, when u, w, and R are fixed, defectors claim a fixed fraction
(at least 1{2) of the total population, which means that cooperators are disfavored relative to defectors.
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Figure 5. Mutation-selection dynamics when a population of defectors can sustain itself
at a positive carrying capacity (f1 ą 1). The baseline reproductive capacity is fN “
max
 
0, cK ` r
`
1´ NK
˘(
, where cK “ 1, r “ 0.001, and K “ 5000. In each panel, the
population starts out with 100 cooperators and 100 defectors. In (A), w “ 0 and cooperators
are indistinguishable from defectors. The population grows to a metastable equilibrium with
roughly equal frequencies of cooperators and defectors; pxC˚ , xD˚q “ p2500, 2500q. In (B), the
cost of cooperation is positive (w “ 0.002) and defectors begin to outnumber cooperators;
pxC˚ , xD˚q « p4287, 5219q. At the metastable equilibrium, however, cooperators in (B) slightly
outnumber cooperators in (A). In (C), the cost of cooperation is increased to w “ 0.01 and
the gap between cooperator and defector abundance widens; pxC˚ , xD˚q « p5806, 13890q.
Although cooperators are less frequent than defectors in (C), they are more abundant in
(C) than they were in (A) and (B), suggesting that their abundance is favored by selection
even though their relative frequency is not. Parameters: u “ 0.01 and R “ 2.0.
However, based on population growth alone, cooperators could be considered to be favored by selection in
an absolute sense because their abundance is an increasing function of the cost of cooperation, w.
4. Discussion
Public goods games have been used to model conflicts of interest ranging from cooperation in microorgan-
isms [50–54], to alarm calls in monkeys [55, 56], sentinel behavior in meerkats [57], and large-scale human
efforts aimed at combating climate change [58, 59] and pollution [60]. Due to its linearity and close rela-
tionship to the prisoner’s dilemma, the public goods game we consider is sometimes called the “N -person
prisoner’s dilemma” [61]. Provided 1 ď R ď N , this game presents a conflict of interest between the group
and the individual that can be reduced to a sequence of N´1 prisoner’s dilemma interactions [62]. However,
the analysis and interpretation of a single public goods game is somewhat more straightforward than that
of a series of prisoner’s dilemma interactions when the population size fluctuates over time.
In populations of fixed size, extinction is impossible and defectors can survive without the support of
cooperators. This point marks perhaps the most prominent feature of classical models in evolutionary game
theory that breaks down when the population size can fluctuate over time. When populations vary in size
and defectors cannot sustain themselves on their own, cooperators must be present and selection must be
sufficiently strong in order to maintain the existence of the population (Fig. 3). Furthermore, when the
population size is assumed to be fixed, selection decreases the frequency of cooperators if and only if it
decreases the number, or abundance, of cooperators. In fluctuating populations, selection can decrease the
frequency of cooperators while increasing their abundance (Fig. 5).
We have referred to w as the “cost of cooperation” because of its interpretation as the expected fraction
of offspring that must be sacrificed in order to cooperate. However, we note that because this fraction of
an individual’s baseline reproductive capacity is shared across the population, larger w also means a greater
effect of cooperation (similar to the return, R). Further, if w “ 0 then the population is identical to a
population of defectors. In standard Wright-Fisher processes, fN is irrelevant and it is common to rewrite
the terms in Eq. 4 as FC “ 1 ` wpiC and FD “ 1 ` wpiD, and to refer to w the “strength” [40, 63, 64] or
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“intensity” of selection [8, 65, 66]. When the population size is held constant in our model, w corresponds
exactly to this well-known notion of selection intensity.
That the frequencies of cooperators relative to defectors in the metastable equilibria of Figs. 3(C),
3(F), and 5(C) are all the same is not a coincidence. The fraction of cooperators, p, present at a metastable
equilibrium is independent of the baseline reproductive capacity, fN , and depends on only the mutation rate,
u; the cost of cooperation, w; and the multiplication factor for the public goods game, R. The population
size at a metastable equilibrium, however, does depend on fN . In Appendix B, we give an explicit formula
for p and a condition for the existence of a non-zero metastable equilibrium in terms of fN , w, R, and p.
In the absence of mutation, either cooperators or defectors must be extinct in any metastable equilibrium.
Although defectors outperform cooperators in a mixed population, a population of cooperators reaches a
higher carrying capacity and persists at this size for a longer time than does a population of defectors. Small
populations of cooperators have a distinct advantage over their all-defector counterparts due to larger growth
rates. In particular, quick extinction is less likely for all-cooperator populations than it is for all-defector
populations, reflecting observations of Huang et al. [23] and Waite et al. [67] for related models.
Unlike in the models of Houchmandzadeh and Vallade [68] and Houchmandzadeh [30], the population size
in our model is not a deterministic function of the fraction of cooperators. Rather, it is a random quantity
derived from the collective offspring pool of the parental generation. The population size at time t ` 1
depends on both the number of cooperators and the number of defectors at time t.
A framework more similar to ours is that of Behar et al. [69], which uses stochastic differential equations
to model the numbers of producers and non-producers of a common resource. Both numbers increase
when small but eventually non-producers drive the population to extinction. Analogous to the possible
role of mutations described here, Behar et al. [69] allow migration to reseed populations with producers. A
metastable equilibrium may then occur in the total population even as each local population experiences
boom and bust cycles. Our focus here has been on treating baseline reproductive dynamics as an exogenous
feature and understanding on how these may be perturbed by a game to allow a variety of different carrying
capacities to emerge depending on the parameters of the model.
Since population size can fluctuate in our model, one could also allow the multiplication factor of the public
good, represented here by R, to change with N . If this multiplication factor gets weaker as N grows, then
one observes dynamics similar to those here even if fN is independent of N . Viewing R as a function of N
presents an alternative way to model populations that cannot have unbounded growth due to environmental
constraints. Another extension of our model could involve asymmetric mutation rates with, for example,
C Ñ D mutations more likely than D Ñ C. Although the importance of asymmetric mutation in population
models is well-established [70–72], we do not expect this would cause any qualitative changes in the results
reported here unless the asymmetry was very extreme.
Incorporating dynamic population size into classical evolutionary models complicates the analysis of their
dynamics. Notably, how one measures the evolutionary success of cooperators is not as unambiguous here
as it is in models with fixed population size. We have shown that selection can favor cooperator abundance
despite disfavoring cooperator frequency, and that even though cooperators are exploited by defectors, they
can be crucial to the survival of the population as a whole.
Appendix A. Wright-Fisher branching process
A.1. Update rule. Suppose that the population is unstructured but allowed to vary in size. For simplicity,
assume that we are dealing with a symmetric game with two strategies, C (“cooperate”) and D (“defect”).
A state of the population is then uniquely defined by a pair, pxC , xDq, where xC and xC are the number of
players using C and D, respectively. The population size is N “ xC ` xD, which can vary over time.
Suppose that the reproductive capacities of cooperators and defectors in state pxC , xDq are given by
functions FC “ FC pxC , xDq and FD “ FD pxC , xDq, respectively. That is, the reproductive capacities are
frequency-dependent and determined by the number of each type of player in the population. We define
reproductive capacity as the expected number of surviving offspring of an individual over its lifetime. Ours
is therefore an “absolute” interpretation of reproductive capacity. We assume a reproductive mechanism in
which the number of offspring is Poisson-distributed with mean equal to the parent’s reproductive capacity.
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Therefore, the probability of transitioning from pxC , xDq to pyC , yDq over a single generation in this “Wright-
Fisher branching process” is
PWFBpyC , yD | xC , xDq “
ˆ pxCFCqyC e´xCFC
yC !
˙ˆ pxDFDqyD e´xDFD
yD!
˙
. (7)
As in the standard Wright-Fisher process, we assume that generations are non-overlapping.
Remark 1. If the population size is static and fixed at N , then, for xC ` xD “ yC ` yD “ N ,
PWFBpyC , yD | xC , xD ; fixed population sizeq
“
´ pxCFCqyC e´xCFC
yC !
¯´ pxDFDqyD e´xDFD
yD!
¯
ř
zC`zD“N
´ pxCFCqzC e´xCFC
zC !
¯´ pxDFDqzD e´xDFD
zD!
¯
“
´ pxCFCqyC e´xCFC
yC !
¯´ pxDFDqyD e´xDFD
yD!
¯
1
N !
ř
zC`zD“N N !
´ pxCFCqzC e´xCFC
zC !
¯´ pxDFDqzD e´xDFD
zD!
¯
“
´ pxCFCqyC e´xCFC
yC !
¯´ pxDFDqyD e´xDFD
yD!
¯
1
N ! pxCFC ` xDFDqN e´pxCFC`xDFDq
“ N !
yC !yD!
ˆ
xCFC
xCFC ` xDFD
˙yC ˆ xDFD
xCFC ` xDFD
˙yD
“ PWFpyC | xCq, (8)
recovering the classical transition rule based on binomial sampling [33]. Therefore, the update rule defined
by Eq. 7 may be thought of as a generalization of the classical, frequency-dependent Wright-Fisher process.
A.2. Reproductive capacities and selection. In the absence of selection, each player in a population
of size N has a reproductive capacity determined by a baseline reproductive capacity, fN . We consider the
following two functional forms for fN , examples of which are depicted in Fig. 1 in the main text.
A.2.1. Rectified linear. One natural way to model reproductive capacity is as a linear function of the pop-
ulation size, N . In this case, we can write fN “ max
 
0, cK ` r
`
1´ NK
˘(
for some parameters cK , r, and
K. We refer to fN as a “rectified” linear reproductive capacity since it piecewise-linear with the constraint
fN ě 0 for every N . Note that fN˚ “ 1 when N˚ “ K
`
1´ 1r p1´ cKq
˘
. Therefore, N˚ may be interpreted
as the (neutral) carrying capacity of the population since when fN˚ “ 1 each individual is replaced by one
offspring on average. Note that K itself is not necessarily the neutral carrying capacity for this form of fN .
A.2.2. Threshold-constant. If the reproductive capacity is constant, then every player expects to produce
1`r offspring that survive into the next generation, where r ě ´1. We assume that this growth is eventually
bounded by environmental constraints, so we set fN “ p1` rqmin t1,K{Nu for some K. We refer to fN
as a “threshold-constant” reproductive capacity since it is constant up to a threshold (N “ K) and then
decreasing to 0 beyond K. When r ă 0, there is no solution to fN “ 1 since fN ď 1 ` r ă 1 for each N .
When r ą 0, we have fp1`rqK “ 1, so N˚ “ p1` rqK is the neutral carrying capacity of the population.
A.2.3. Selection. In a game with strategies C and D, let piC pxC , yCq and piD pxC , xDq be the total payoffs
to C and D, respectively, when there are xC cooperators and xD defectors. If the population size is fixed,
then a payoff of pi is typically converted to a fitness of f by defining f “ 1` wpi, where w is the “selection
strength” [see 40, 73]. This perturbation approach has even been extended to asymmetric games played
between different populations [74]. While our setup is somewhat different, we maintain this convention of
using payoffs from a game to perturb reproductive capacities. In particular, if w is a parameter representing
the intensity of selection, then the reproductive capacities of cooperators and defectors are given by
FC pxC , xDq :“
´
1` wpiC pxC , xDq
¯
fxC`xD ; (9a)
FD pxC , xDq :“
´
1` wpiD pxC , xDq
¯
fxC`xD , (9b)
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respectively. In other words, the baseline reproductive capacity, fxC`xD , is perturbed by the game according
to the strength of selection, w. In order to maintain non-negative reproductive capacities, w must be
sufficiently small. In the next section, we consider a public goods game in which w has a clear biological
interpretation.
Appendix B. Dynamics of the public goods game
In the public goods game, a cooperator sacrifices a fraction, w, of his or her baseline reproductive capacity
in order to contribute to a public good. This contribution is enhanced by a factor of R ą 1 and then
distributed evenly among all of the players in the population. In terms of the payoff function in Eq. 9a, we
have piC pxC , xDq “ R
´
xC
xC`xD
¯
´ 1 and piD pxC , xDq “ R
´
xC
xC`xD
¯
as well as Eq. 4 in the main text.
B.1. Metastable equilibria. Consider a population evolving according to the update rule of Eq. 3. As
noted in the main text, such a branching process either grows without bound or eventually goes extinct.
Even when the population has an extinction probability of 1, there can be so-called “metastable” states
(or “equilibria”) around which the population fluctuates for many generations. While a quasi-stationary
distribution for the process describes the distribution of strategy abundances prior to extinction, a metastable
equilibrium describes the mean(s) around which these strategy counts fluctuate. We are interested in when
these metastable equilibria exist and how they are influenced by the parameters of the model.
Let EpxC ,xDq ryCs (resp. EpxC ,xDq ryDs) be the expected abundance of cooperators (resp. defectors) in the
next generation given xC cooperators and xD defectors in the current generation. Formally, a metastable
equilibrium for this process is a state at which Epx˚C ,x˚Dq ryCs “ xC˚ and Epx˚C ,x˚Dq ryDs “ xD˚. That is,
cooperator and defector abundances each remain unchanged (on average) at a metastable equilibrium. We
use the term “metastable” because the population fluctuates around this state but eventually goes extinct.
We discuss extinction time in Appendix C. First, we derive the metastable equilibria for public goods games.
B.1.1. Derivation of metastable equilibria. Let u be the strategy-mutation rate. With probability 1´ u, an
offspring acquires the strategy of the parent. With probability u, the offspring takes on one of C and D
uniformly at random. In state pxC , xDq, the expected number of cooperators in the next generation is
EpxC ,xDq ryCs “
ÿ
pyC ,yDq
PWFBpyC , yD | xC , xDq
´´
1´ u
2
¯
yC `
´u
2
¯
yD
¯
“
ÿ
pyC ,yDq
ˆ pxCFCqyC e´xCFC
yC !
˙ˆ pxDFDqyD e´xDFD
yD!
˙´´
1´ u
2
¯
yC `
´u
2
¯
yD
¯
“
´
1´ u
2
¯
xCFC `
´u
2
¯
xDFD. (10)
Similarly, the expected number of defectors in the next generation is
`
u
2
˘
xCFC `
`
1´ u2
˘
xDFD. Therefore,
the system of equations we need to solve in order to find a metastable equilibrium is
xC “
´
1´ u
2
¯
xCFC `
´u
2
¯
xDFD; (11a)
xD “
´u
2
¯
xCFC `
´
1´ u
2
¯
xDFD. (11b)
In other words, it must be true that
xC “
”´
1´ u
2
¯
xC
´
1` wpiC pxC , xDq
¯
`
´u
2
¯
xD
´
1` wpiD pxC , xDq
¯ı
fxC`xD ; (12a)
xD “
”´u
2
¯
xC
´
1` wpiC pxC , xDq
¯
`
´
1´ u
2
¯
xD
´
1` wpiD pxC , xDq
¯ı
fxC`xD . (12b)
These equations are trivially satisfied when xC “ xD “ 0 (population extinction). There can also be solutions
to Eq. 12 with xC ‰ 0 or xD ‰ 0; we give a condition for the existence of non-zero solutions below.
Remark 2. If u “ 0, then Eq. 12 reduces to the system
xC “
´
1` wpiC pxC , xDq
¯
xCfxC`xD ; (13a)
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xD “
´
1` wpiD pxC , xDq
¯
xDfxC`xD . (13b)
If xC and xD satisfy this system and xC , xD ‰ 0, then´
1` wpiC pxC , xDq
¯
fxC`xD “
´
1` wpiD pxC , xDq
¯
fxC`xD “ 1. (14)
Therefore, either w “ 0 and fxC`xD “ 1 or w ‰ 0 and piC pxC , xDq “ piD pxC , xDq. However, for the public
goods game, it is always the case that piC pxC , xDq ă piD pxC , xDq when xC ą 0, so it must be true that
w “ 0 and fxC`xD “ 1. Thus, if u “ 0 and w ą 0, then any solution satisfies xC “ 0 or xD “ 0. In other
words, in the absence of mutation, selection forces the extinction of at least one strategy.
Similarly, if u ą 0 and there is a solution pxC , xDq with xC “ 0, then one obtains xDFD “ 0 from Eq. 11a
and xD “ 0 from Eq. 11b. For a similar reason, if there is solution with xD “ 0, then it must also be true
that xC “ 0. Thus, if pxC , xDq is a non-zero solution to Eq. 12 when u ą 0, then xC ą 0 and xD ą 0.
Lemma 1. If u ą 0, then there exists p P p0, 1q such that any non-zero solution to Eq. 12, pxC , xDq, satisfies
xC
xC`xD “ p. In other words, the fraction of cooperators is the same in any solution to Eq. 12.
Proof. If pxC , xDq is a solution to Eq. 12 with xC , xD ě 0 and xC ` xD ą 0, then, with p :“ xCxC`xD ,
p “ xC
xC ` xD
“
`
1´ u2
˘
xC
´
1` wpiC pxC , xDq
¯
` `u2 ˘xD´1` wpiD pxC , xDq¯
xC
´
1` wpiC pxC , xDq
¯
` xD
´
1` wpiD pxC , xDq
¯
“
`
1´ u2
˘ ´
xC
xC`xD
¯´
1` wpiC
´
xC
xC`xD ,
xD
xC`xD
¯¯
` `u2 ˘ ´ xDxC`xD ¯´1` wpiD ´ xCxC`xD , xDxC`xD ¯¯´
xC
xC`xD
¯´
1` wpiC
´
xC
xC`xD ,
xD
xC`xD
¯¯
`
´
xD
xC`xD
¯´
1` wpiD
´
xC
xC`xD ,
xD
xC`xD
¯¯
“
`
1´ u2
˘
p
´
1` wpiC pp, 1´ pq
¯
` `u2 ˘ p1´ pq´1` wpiD pp, 1´ pq¯
p
´
1` wpiC pp, 1´ pq
¯
` p1´ pq
´
1` wpiD pp, 1´ pq
¯ . (15)
Since piC pxC , xDq “ R
´
xC
xC`xD
¯
´ 1 and piD pxC , xDq “ R
´
xC
xC`xD
¯
, Eq. 15 is equivalent to
ϕ ppq :“ 2 p1´ uRqwp2 ` puw pR` 1q ´ 2u´ 2wq p` u “ 0. (16)
Since ϕ ppq is (at most) quadratic, ϕ p0q “ u, and ϕ p1q “ ´u p1´ w `Rwq, we see that if u ą 0, then there
is a unique solution to Eq. 15 that falls within r0, 1s, and, furthermore, this solution is in p0, 1q. Explicitly,
p “ uw pR` 1q ´ 2u´ 2w `
?
u2w2R2 ` 2u2w2R` 4u2wR´ 4uw2R` u2w2 ´ 4u2w ` 4u2 ´ 4uw2 ` 4w2
4 puR´ 1qw
(17)
if R ‰ 1{u and w ‰ 0, and p “ u{ p2u` p1´ uqwq if R “ 1{u or w “ 0, which completes the proof. 
From the proof of Lemma 1, we see that if u “ 0, then either (i) w “ 0 and every p P r0, 1s is a solution to
Eq. 15 or (ii) w ą 0 and the only solutions to Eq. 15 are p “ 0 and p “ 1. For any u P r0, 1s, the fraction of
cooperators in a non-zero metastable equilibrium is independent of the baseline reproductive capacity, fN .
However, the existence of a metastable equilibrium and the size of the population at such an equilibrium
both depend on the baseline reproductive capacity. Suppose that xC “ pN and xD “ p1´ pqN satisfy
Eq. 12, where p P r0, 1s is a fraction of cooperators that satisfies Eq. 15. From Eq. 12,
p “
”´
1´ u
2
¯
p
´
1` wpiC pp, 1´ pq
¯
`
´u
2
¯
p1´ pq
´
1` wpiD pp, 1´ pq
¯ı
fN ; (18a)
1´ p “
”´u
2
¯
p
´
1` wpiC pp, 1´ pq
¯
`
´
1´ u
2
¯
p1´ pq
´
1` wpiD pp, 1´ pq
¯ı
fN , (18b)
which, in turn, holds if and only if the total population size, N satisfies
fN “ 1
1` w pR´ 1q p . (19)
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Figure 6. Evolutionary game dynamics when there is no mutation and the baseline repro-
ductive capacity, fN , is defined by fN “ max
 
0, cK ` r
`
1´ NK
˘(
, where cK “ 1, r “ 0.005,
and K “ 1000. The multiplication factor for the public goods game is R “ 1.5 and the cost
of cooperation is w “ 0.01. In (A), the population is initialized with no cooperators and
10 defectors. The defectors grow until they reach their carrying capacity of 1000 and then
persist at this metastable equilibrium (f1 ě 1). In (B), the population is initialized with
10 cooperators and no defectors. The cooperators then grow in abundance until they reach
their carrying capacity of approximately 2000 players. It is immediate from panels (A) and
(B) that groups of cooperators perform better than groups of defectors since selection allows
them to reach a higher carrying capacity. In (C), the population is initialized with 10 coop-
erators and no defectors, and the population then proceeds to reach its carrying capacity.
After 5000 generations, an additional 10 defectors are introduced into the population, which
disrupts the metastable equilibrium reached by the all-cooperator population. Defectors
then outcompete and replace cooperators and finally reach their carrying capacity, which,
as in (A), is significantly lower than the carrying capacity of an all-cooperator population.
The right-hand-side of Eq. 19 is independent of fN , and once this quantity is calculated, it is straightforward
to check for any fN whether there exists N for which Eq. 19 holds. If fN is strictly monotonic, then there
exists at most one N that satisfies this equation. For other types of baseline reproductive capacities, there
might be several such N that satisfy Eq. 19 (resulting in several non-zero metastable equilibria).
In addition to the simulations described in the main text, Figs. 6–7 demonstrate further effects of model
parameters on metastable equilibria.
Lemma 2. If u P p0, 1q and w ‰ 0, then p is a strictly increasing function of R with p Ò 1{2 as RÑ8.
Proof. Since the polynomial defined by Eq. 16 satisfies ϕ p0q “ u and ϕ p1{2q “ ´w p1´ uq {2, we see that
the solution to ϕ ppq “ 0 that falls within r0, 1s is actually at most 1{2. Moreover, we can write
ϕR ppq :“ ϕ ppq “ 2 puR´ 1qwp
ˆ
1
2
´ p
˙
´
´
p1´ uqw ` 2u
¯
p` u, (20)
where, notably, only the coefficient of p
`
1
2 ´ p
˘
depends on R. Thus, if R1 ă R2 and p1 satisfies ϕR1 pp1q “ 0,
then ϕR2 pp1q ą 0. Since ϕ p1{2q ă 0, the unique solution to ϕR2 pp2q “ 0 satisfies p2 ą p1, thus p is an
increasing function of R. That p Ò 1{2 as RÑ8 follows immediately from taking the limit of Eq. 17. 
Theorem 1. Suppose that fN Ó 0 as N Ñ 8. If u ‰ 0 and w ‰ 0, then, for each N ě 1, there is a critical
multiplication factor, RN˚ ě 1, which is the minimum multiplication factor for which there exists a non-zero
metastable equilibrium supporting a population size of at least N whenever R ě RN˚ .
Proof. Since p Ò 1{2 as RÑ8, we see that 11`wpR´1qp Ó 0 as RÑ8. Let
RN˚ :“ inf
"
R ě 1 | fN 1 “ 1
1` w pR´ 1q p for some N
1 ě N
*
. (21)
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Figure 7. Mutation-selection dynamics with drastically reduced mutation rates. The pa-
rameters used here are u “ 0.00001, w “ 0.005, and R “ 2.0. The baseline reproductive
capacity is fN “ max
 
0, cK ` r
`
1´ NK
˘(
, where cK “ 0.995, r “ 0.005, and K “ 2000.
The population is initialized with 100 cooperators and no defectors, and the cooperators
then grow to reach their carrying capacity. Although small clusters of defectors are occa-
sionally introduced through mutation, cooperators can resist invasion for a short period of
time. Eventually, defectors invade and replace cooperators, and the population goes extinct
due to the fact that defectors cannot survive on their own (f1 ă 1).
Since fN Ó 0 as N Ñ 8, we have RN˚ ă 8. If R ě RN˚ and N 1 satisfies fN 1 “ 11`wpR˚N´1qp , then
pxC˚ , xD˚q “ ppN 1, p1´ pqN 1q is a metastable equilibrium by Eq. 18. Furthermore, if R ě RN˚ , then
1
1` w pR´ 1q p ď
1
1` w pRN˚ ´ 1q p
, (22)
and it follows that any solution to fN2 “ 11`wpR´1qp satisfies N2 ě N 1 ě N , as desired. 
Remark 3. If infNě1 fN ą 0, then Theorem 1 need not hold. For example, whenever R is sufficiently large
and w ‰ 0, we have 11`wpR´1qp ă infNě1 fN , so no value of N satisfies Eq. 19.
B.1.2. Variance. In state pxC , xDq, the expected squared number of cooperators in the next generation is
EpxC ,xDq
“
y2C
‰ “ ÿ
pyC ,yDq
PWFB pyC , yD | xC , xDqm2, (23)
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where
m2 “
yCÿ
a“0
yDÿ
b“0
pa` bq2
ˆ
yC
a
˙´
1´ u
2
¯a ´u
2
¯yC´aˆyD
b
˙´
1´ u
2
¯yD´b ´u
2
¯b
“
´
1´ u
2
¯
yC
´
1`
´
1´ u
2
¯
pyC ´ 1q
¯
` 2
´u
2
¯´
1´ u
2
¯
yCyD `
´u
2
¯
yD
´
1`
´u
2
¯
pyD ´ 1q
¯
. (24)
It follows from a straightforward calculation that
EpxC ,xDq
“
y2C
‰ “ ”´1´ u
2
¯
pxCFCq `
´u
2
¯
pxDFDq
ı
`
”´
1´ u
2
¯
pxCFCq `
´u
2
¯
pxDFDq
ı2
“ EpxC ,xDq ryCs `EpxC ,xDq ryCs2 . (25)
Therefore, VarpxC ,xDq ryCs “ EpxC ,xDq ryCs, and, similarly, VarpxC ,xDq ryDs “ EpxC ,xDq ryDs. Thus,
σpxC ,xDq ryCs {EpxC ,xDq ryCs “
1b
EpxC ,xDq ryCs
; (26a)
σpxC ,xDq ryDs {EpxC ,xDq ryDs “
1b
EpxC ,xDq ryDs
, (26b)
which both approach 0 as EpxC ,xDq ryCs and EpxC ,xDq ryDs get large.
Appendix C. Extinction time for branching games
We now characterize the extinction time for our model, inspired by techniques used in classical branching
processes [see 47–49]. Let x “ pxC{K,xD{Kq be normalized quantities of cooperators and defectors, where
K ą 0 parametrizes the baseline reproductive capacity, fN . Let
A pxq :“
ˆp1´ uqFC pxKq uFD pxKq
uFC pxKq p1´ uqFD pxKq
˙
, (27)
and consider the map, φ, defined by
φ : R2ě0 ÝÑ R2ě0
: x ÞÝÑ A pxqx. (28)
Since FC and FD are bounded, so too is φ.
We consider the normalized Markov chain XKt “ pCt{K,Dt{Kq, where Ct and Dt are the number of
cooperators and defectors at time t, respectively. Write pK px, yq “ P
“
XKt`1 “ y | XKt “ x
‰
for the transition
kernel. The transition probabilities are Poisson-distributed with mean given by the matrix A pxq. Note that
pK p0, yq “ 0 for all y ‰ 0 since 0 is an absorbing state.
A measure µK P ∆
`
R2ě0 ´ 0
˘
is a quasi-stationary distribution for pK if there exists λK P p0, 1q such thatż
xPR2ě0´0
pK px,Eq dµK pxq “ λKµK pEq . (29)
for all E Ď R2ě0´0. We denote the extinction time, i.e. the time until the chain is absorbed at the state 0, by
τK . Note that, if we start distributed according to a quasi-stationary distribution, µK , then the probability
of being absorbed in the next step is 1´ λK since
P
“
XKt`1 “ 0 | XKt „ µK
‰ “ ż
xPR2ě0´0
pK px,0q dµK pxq
“
ż
xPR2ě0´0
´
1´ pK
`
x,R2ě0 ´ 0
˘ ¯
dµK pxq
“ 1´ λK . (30)
Moreover, if not absorbed in the next time step, the chain remains distributed according to µK . Therefore,
the extinction time τK is a geometric random variable with parameter 1 ´ λK , and E rτKs “ 1{ p1´ λKq,
where E rτKs denotes the expected value of τK when the chain is initially distributed according to µK .
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Proposition 1. There exists c ą 0, independent of K, such that E rτKs ě ecK .
Proof. For the model considered in the main text, φ has a unique fixed point, x˚, with φ px˚q “ x˚.
Moreover, this fixed point is an attractor. (One can show that the normalized quasi-stationary distribution
µK converges weakly to δx˚ as K Ñ 8.) Therefore, there exists δ ą 0 and an open set, U , containing x˚
such that Nδ
`
φ
`
U
˘˘ Ď U , where for E Ď R2ě0 ´ 0, the δ-neighborhood of E is defined as
Nδ pEq :“
"
y P R2ě0 ´ 0 | inf
xPE }y ´ x} ă δ
*
. (31)
By definition of the quasi-stationary distribution, µK , we have
λKµK pUq “
ż
xPR2ě0´0
pKpx, Uq dµKpxq
ě
ż
xPU
pK px, Uq dµK pxq
ě µK pUq inf
xPU
pK px, Uq
“ µK pUq
˜
1´ sup
xPU
pK px, U cq
¸
. (32)
For x P U , φ pxq P φ `U˘, which implies that Nδ pφ pxqq Ă Nδ `φ `U˘˘ Ă U . Therefore,
λK ě 1´ sup
xPU
pK px, U cq
ě 1´ sup
xPU
pK px,Nδ pφ pxqqcq . (33)
To complete the proof, we bound pK px,Nδ pφ pxqqcq via a large-deviation estimate based on the Chernoff-
Cramer method. If Z is a Poisson random variable with mean φ pxqK, then
pK px,Nδ pφ pxqqcq “ P
“
XKt`1 R Nδ pφ pxqq | XKt “ x
‰
“ P “ˇˇXKt`1 ´ φ pxqˇˇ ą δ | XKt “ x‰
“ P r|Z ´ φ pxqK| ą δKs . (34)
Using Markov’s inequality and the Poisson moment-generating function, we see that
P rZ ą pφ pxq ` δqKs ď E
“
etZ
‰
etpφpxq`δqK
“ e
φpxqKpet´1q
etpφpxq`δqK
. (35)
As a function of t, the minimum of e
φpxqKpet´1q
etpφpxq`δqK is at t
˚ “ log p1` δ{φ pxqq. Since the function g pyq :“
log p1` δ{yq py ` δq ´ δ satisfies g pyq ą 0 and g1 pyq ă 0 for all y ą 0, we have
P rZ ą pφ pxq ` δqKs ď e´gpφpxqqK ď e´gpmqK , (36)
where m “ maxxPR2ě0 φ pxq. It follows that with c :“ g pmq,
E rτKs “ 1
1´ λK ě e
cK , (37)
which completes the proof. 
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